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NOTE
"THEY TOLD ME HE SAID HE WOULD KILL ME."'
WHY HEARSAY SHOULD GET FULL WEIGHT
IN ASYLUM PROCEEDINGS
2
"[M]y family has always told me that they are looking for me. I'm
being sought out and they killed my father and later they killed my
uncle, then the same thing will happen to me."
3
"How does a refugee prove that a guerilla came to his home and
made verbal threats on his life?",4 Through hearsay testimony. Quoted
above, Leticia Cordon-Garcia testified at her asylum hearing that
guerillas threatened and even killed some of her relatives while de-
manding her whereabouts.5 Her understanding of these events rested
upon hearsay, and sometimes even double hearsay. 6 Taking into ac-
count the difficulty with which a refugee must prove his or her claim,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000 ruled the hearsay nature of
1. This quote paraphrases an excerpt of Kulvier Singh's testimony in Singh v.
Gonzales. See Singh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2005). Singh testified
in his asylum proceeding that his uncle told him that the Indian police said they
would kill Singh if they found him. Id. This statement is hearsay under the definition
found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
2. This Note is dedicated to Xiaoxong Gu and to those who flee persecution.
"[A]nd you will be hated by all because of my name. But the one who endures to the
end will be saved. When they persecute you in one town, flee to the next; for truly I
tell you, you will not have gone through all the towns of Israel before the Son of
Man comes." Matthew 10:22-23 (New Revised Standard Version).
3. Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2000).
4. Laura Isabel Bauer, They Beg for Our Protection and We Refuse: U.S. Asy-
lum Law's Failure to Protect Many of Today's Refugees, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1081, 1090 (2004).
5. Cordon-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 992.
6. Id.
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her testimony inconsequential. 7 In July 2006, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ignored the refugee's plight and took a different approach to hear-
say testimony in asylum proceedings. 8 In Gu v. Gonzales, the court
held that hearsay evidence may receive less weight than non-hearsay
evidence. 9 This Note argues for a return to the reasoning articulated in
Cordon-Garcia, and more specifically that the trier of fact should give
a credible claimant's hearsay testimony full weight.
Asylum proceedings are filled with hearsay testimony. 10 In these
hearings, hearsay evidence is generally admissible." However, in the
special situation of a refugee,' 2 hearsay evidence needs to be more
than just admissible. It should be deemed reliable. Plainly put, hearsay
should be deemed reliable because it may be the only evidence the
claimant has. By virtue of the very status the claimant is trying to
prove, hearsay evidence may be the only kind of evidence available. 3
7. Id. at 992-93 (citing Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1996);
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1985)).
8. Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Yang v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Testimony of Yi Long Yang) ("[T]hey said according to birth control policy nobody
should get pregnant before ... they get [sic] official marriage certificate."); Shiny-
helskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Shmyhelskyy also testified
... that when he visited Nesenyuk in the hospital, Nesenyuk told him that he regret-
ted sponsoring Shmyhelskyy's membership in the RP and that he should run for his
life and try to save himself."); Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir.
2007) ("She testified that the police officer told her that these were cultural practices
and should not be changed."); Chang Lin v. Gonzales, No. 05-4461-AG, slip op. at 2
(2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2006) ("Additional questioning on cross examination elicited little
more than Lin's reiteration that his wife had told him that she had been forced to un-
dergo the abortions.").
11. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021 (citing Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.
1983)) ("In the immigration context, hearsay is admissible if it is probative and its
admission is fundamentally fair.").
12. A refugee is a person fearing persecution if retumed to his or her home.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (2000).
13. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the
REAL ID Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 123 (2006) ("In many
cases ... the more legitimate the persecution, the less likely it is that the asylum
seeker will have the required proof. As such, establishment of an accurate but not
unduly burdensome corroboration process can be very difficult."); Derek C. Smith
& Bruce A. Hake, Evidence Issues in Asylum Cases, 90-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 27
(1990) ('T'he most important, and sometimes the only, evidence in asylum cases is
2
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However counterintuitive it may seem in a legal culture that pursues
truth and shuns fraud, this Note proposes that if an asylum claimant is
deemed credible, the trier of fact should accord hearsay evidence full
weight. Part I presents the facts and holding of Gu v. Gonzales, sum-
marizes general asylum law and explains the evidentiary rules of asy-
lum proceedings. Part II demonstrates the inverse relationship be-
tween the special circumstances of a refugee and the ability of that
refugee to establish refugee status. Part III identifies the fears and
hesitations surrounding hearsay evidence and its reliability. The sec-
ond section of Part III argues that these reservations presuppose a
standard of accuracy that is nearly impossible to achieve in the context
of asylum seekers. Part IV contends that if the asylum claimant is
found credible, the trier of fact should not only be able but required to
give hearsay evidence full weight. Part IV then applies this construct
to Gu's case. Cautiously acknowledging faults in other procedural
steps, Part IV then warns of defects that may lie in a credibility deter-
mination and admits that if a credible claimant's hearsay testimony is
given full weight, the process of reaching a credibility determination
must also be refined. Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating that the
trier of fact must give the claimant's credible testimony full weight
because a refugee cannot be expected to obtain direct, first-hand evi-
dence of persecution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Gu v. Gonzales
Chinese native Xiaoguang Gu developed an interest in Christian-
ity after his sister sent him Christian materials from the United
States.14 Upon receiving these materials, Gu began attending the
Christian church sponsored by the Chinese government and soon
sought baptism.1 5 After a few months, however, Gu stopped attending
the government-run church because he suspected the church ignored
the applicant's testimony. The BIA has ruled that when the applicant's testimony is
the only evidence available, it can suffice to establish eligibility for asylum if it is
believable, consistent and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent
account of the basis of the applicant's fear.").
14. Opening Brief for Petitioner at 3, Gu, 454 F.3d 1014 (No. 02-74417).
15. Id.
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Biblical teachings and touted the Chinese government's political opin-
ion.' 6 Instead, Gu attended an unofficial, Christian "house church,'
7
comprised of about six or seven attendees who gathered at a friend's
home on Sundays. 18 Presumably enthusiastic about his new religion,
Gu copied the evangelical pamphlets his sister had sent him and dis-
tributed them to church members and coworkers. 19 Later that year,
public security officers arrested Gu and interrogated him for two
hours, inquiring into the origin of the religious pamphlets. 20 When Gu
refused to reveal the source of the materials the police repeatedly beat
him with a rod. 2' After three days of confinement and the payment of
a bond, the officers released Gu on the condition that he report to the
police weekly. 2
2
After his release, Gu tried to keep quiet.23 He stopped attending
the house church because he feared another arrest.24 At work, Gu's
employer warned Gu that he would lose his job if he engaged in any
more illegal activities.25 Too scared to gather with others at the under-
ground house church, Gu instead chose to read his Bible at home. 26
Gu left China several months after his arrest and came to the United
States on a fraudulently obtained business visa.27 Once in the United
States, Gu spoke with his wife on the phone, and she told him that
public security officers had inquired as to his whereabouts. 28 In an-
other phone call to China, a friend told Gu to stop calling his family
16. Id.
17. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1017. In China, "[u]nofficial Protestants, meeting in unreg-
istered 'house churches,' are estimated to number more than 50 million." In 2005,
the government arrested 1,958 pastors and attendees of these unofficial house
churches. China Executes 15 Christians of Underground Church, SPERO NEWS,
Nov. 29, 2006, http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=6807.
18. Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 3.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 4-5.
21. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1018.
22. Id.; Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 5.
23. See Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 6.
24. See id.
25. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1018.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1017; Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 5.
28. Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 5.
4
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because the security people had come "to his house to look for him." 29
Gu believed that the Chinese authorities came to his family's home in
China because he sent religious materials back to China from the
United States.3 °
Gu applied for asylum claiming that if he returned to China, the
Chinese government would again arrest him and beat him for attend-
ing a house church and distributing religious materials. 31 Gu presented
his story in an asylum hearing in Immigration Court, and the immigra-
tion judge denied his application for asylum. 32 Although the immigra-
tion judge found Gu credible, the judge concluded that, while Gu had
encountered difficulties in practicing Christianity, the facts of Gu's
case did not "'rise to the level of persecution as intended by the immi-
gration laws.' 33 At the next level of administrative review, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's deci-
sion and emphasized the fact that Gu did not "'experience further
problems' in China after his arrest.34
Neither the immigration judge nor the BIA claimed "to give hear-
say testimony less than full weight." 35 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, neither the government nor Gu briefed or argued the
issue of hearsay evidence or its weight. 36 Despite the fact that the is-
sue did not go up on appeal, the majority in the Ninth Circuit decision
found that Gu's primary support for establishing a well-founded fear
of persecution was "hearsay evidence from an anonymous friend., 37
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that in an asylum proceeding the
trier of fact may accord hearsay evidence less weight when weighed
against non-hearsay evidence. 38 Because the immigration judge did
not find that Gu lacked credibility, however, the appellate court had to
29. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1018.
30. See Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 5-6.
31. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1017-18.
32. Brief for Respondent at 3, Gu, 454 F.3d 1014 (No. 02-74417).
33. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1018.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1026 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1021 (majority opinion).
38. Id.
2007]
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accept Gu's factual testimony as true.3 9 This testimony included the
out-of-court statements of both Gu's friend and Gu's wife.40 The ma-
jority, however, reasoned that the principle requiring acceptance of the
credible claimant's testimony as true did "not prevent [the court] from
considering the relative probative value of hearsay and non-hearsay
testimony."'4 Following this logic, the court reasoned that Gu, because
he was found credible, testified truthfully that his friend told him the
security team was looking for him. 42 In contrast, the friend's out-of-
court statement, the strongest piece of evidence supporting the fact
that the security official did come to Gu's house and did ask for Gu,
was not as "'persuasive' or 'specific"' as an in-court, first-hand ac-
count would have been.
43
B. Asylum Law
When a non-citizen arrives in the United States, he or she is eligi-
ble to apply for asylum.44 The applicant has the burden of proving that
he or she is a "refugee," that is, that the applicant will suffer persecu-
tion upon return to the applicant's home country "on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion." 45 If the non-citizen is not in removal proceedings, he
or she may apply to the United States Citizen and Immigration Ser-
vices (USCIS) for asylum.46 If the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) 47 has already instituted proceedings to remove the non-citizen,
39. Id. (citing Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)).
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See id. ("[W]e do not question the veracity of Gu's understanding that his
friend told him that members of China's public security team came to question
him.").
43. Id. (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.
1985)).
44. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2000).
45. Id. § 1101(a)(42), quoted in, Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.
2001).
46. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(a)-(b) (2000); Regina Germain, Seeking Refuge: The
U.S. Asylum Process, 35 COLO. LAW. 71, 74 (2006).
47. The functions of the former Immigration and Nationality Services (INS)
were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security through the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (HSA). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 291 (a)
6
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or if the USCIS has denied the application, the non-citizen may file
the asylum application with the Immigration Court.48 Claims filed be-
fore the immigration judge receive judicial review. 49 Thus, for the
purposes of this Note, the non-citizen is presumed to have brought his
or her claim before the immigration judge.
A claimant establishes refugee status when the claimant demon-
strates either that he or she has suffered persecution in the past or that
the claimant presently has a well-founded fear of suffering persecution
upon return home.50 To prove a well-founded fear of persecution, the
claimant must demonstrate both a subjective and an objective fear of
persecution. 51 The claimant meets the subjective component by pro-
viding credible testimony that he or she will be persecuted on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.52 To fulfill the objective component, the claimant
must meet at least one of two requirements.53 One requirement is to
provide proof of past persecution.54 If an applicant can prove that he
or she previously suffered persecution, then he or she is presumed to
have an objective, well-founded fear of persecution. 55 DHS can rebut
this presumption if it establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the country's conditions have since changed, thus voiding the
likelihood of persecution. 56 Like Gu, a claimant may find it difficult to
(2002). See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 2-3 (4th ed. 2005); David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the
Homeland Security Act Reorganization: An Early Agenda for Practical Improve-
ments, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, Apr. 2003, at 1.
48. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2000); Germain, supra note 46, at 74.
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)-(2)(B)(ii) (2000).
50. Id. § 1101(a)(42).
51. Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Nagoulko v.
INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003)); Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d
739, 743 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir.
2004)); In re Y-B-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1136, 1149 (1998) (citing INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
52. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1019 (citing Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
53. See id.
54. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2000)).
55. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2000).
56. Id.
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prove past persecution because persecution is an "extreme concept," 57
which does not "include every sort of treatment our society regards as
offensive. 58 The other way to satisfy the objective component is to
give "credible, direct, and specific evidence" that supports a reason-
able fear of persecution. 59 To meet this standard, the non-citizen does
not have to prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will suf-
fer persecution upon return home; even a ten percent chance of perse-
cution may suffice. 60 To state it in non-numeric terms, a non-citizen
meets the objective component of a well-founded fear of persecution
if there is a reasonable possibility of actually suffering persecution
once the non-citizen returns home; therefore, he or she cannot avail
him- or herself of the home state's protection. 61 The precedent regard-
ing hearsay established in Gu's asylum proceedings directly affects a
claimant's ability to meet this standard. If hearsay evidence is less
"specific" 62 than a first-hand account, then out-of-court statements
will be less probative especially when proving a well-founded fear of
persecution, interpreted as requiring "credible, direct, and specific
evidence" of such fear.63 Although the claimant need only prove a ten
percent chance of persecution, 64 the Ninth Circuit has made this task
more strenuous by limiting the probative value of hearsay. 65
57. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir.
1995)).
58. Id. (quoting Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).
59. See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Duarte de
Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)).
60. A1-Harbi v. I.N.S, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing INS v. Car-
dozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987)); Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d
739, 743 (9th Cir. 2006).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2) (2000).
62. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021 (quoting Cardozo-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448,
1453 (9th Cir. 1985)).
63. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Duarte de Guinac
v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)).
64. Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d at 888; Canales-Vargas, 441 F.3d at 743.
65. Just ten days after Gu v. Gonzales was decided, a study showed that receiv-
ing asylum is not only arduous, but arbitrary. A study of immigration judges based
on data from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) shows that asy-
lum denials vary by judge from ten percent of all cases to ninety-eight percent of all
cases. Judges Vary on Asylum, PiTTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, July 31, 2006, at A-7.
8
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C. Federal Rules of Evidence and Asylum Proceedings
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to administrative pro-
ceedings. 66 In administrative proceedings generally, evidence is ad-
missible as long as the agency excludes "irrelevant, immaterial, or un-
duly repetitious evidence." 67 Under these more lenient rules,
administrative courts may, without nullifying the proceedings, receive
evidence that a non-administrative court would regard as legally in-
adequate. 68 The "classic exception" to the Federal Rules of Evidence
in administrative proceedings lies in the permitted admission of hear-
say evidence. 69 In a removal proceeding, "the immigration judge may
receive into evidence any oral or written statement that is material and
relevant to any issue in the case.",70 As long as the use of hearsay evi-
dence is fundamentally fair and the evidence itself is probative and
"bears satisfactory indicia of reliability," the evidence will come in.71
Although the general rule of admissibility of hearsay applies to all
administrative adjudications, 72 specific rules for the admission of evi-
dence vary from agency to agency. 73 Within the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), the Department of Justice agency com-
prised of the immigration judges and the BIA,74 there are few formal
rules governing evidence. 75 The main reason for this lack of formality
66. Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Marlowe v.
INS, 457 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)); Navarrette-Navarrette v.
Landon, 223 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 911 (1956); Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2006)).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
68. Navarette-Navarrette, 223 F.2d at 237 (9th Cir. 1955).
69. Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 148; Diaz v. U.S. Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 484, 490
(E.D. Cal. 1987).
70. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2006).
71. Diaz, 658 F. Supp. at 490 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407-
08 (1971)).
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (stating that oral and documentary evidence may be
received by the agency, which presumably includes hearsay evidence).
73. See Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Comment Note-Hearsay Evidence in
Proceedings Before Federal Administrative Agencies, 6 A.L.R. FED. 76 § 12[a]
(1971).
74. United States Department of Justice Website, EOIR Background Informa-
tion, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/ background.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
75. Smith & Hake, supra note 13, at 24.
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is that Department of Justice officials are the adjudicators in asylum
proceedings. 76 Because the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(Rules) is to keep unreliable evidence from the jury, the Rules should
not apply in adjudications held before "experienced administrative ad-
judicators.",77 Referring specifically to hearsay, one scholar has la-
beled this mistrust of the jury the "calibration issue": this is the issue
of whether jurors give appropriate weight to hearsay evidence. 78 In
removal proceedings, there is no need to shield the experienced adju-
dicator from evidence that could lead a jury of laypeople astray.79 In
fact, a hearsay document may be the only basis upon which the adju-
dicator reaches a decision in a removal proceeding.8 °
II. THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REFUGEE STATUS AND NON-
HEARSAY TESTIMONY
An important difference between the relief sought in asylum
claims and the relief sought in other immigration proceedings is that,
because of the definition of refugee, the claimant will often not be
able to corroborate his or her claims. 81 When requesting other relief,
such as cancellation of removal for certain non-permanent residents,
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. David Dunning, On the Social Psychology of Hearsay Evidence, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y, & L. 473, 473 (1999).
79. See Smith & Hake, supra note 13, at 24.
80. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 549 (3rd Cir. 2001). The Supreme
Court has "recognized that a hearsay document (INS Form 1-213) typically consti-
tutes the exclusive basis for a decision made in a removal proceeding." Id. (citing
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)).
81. Asylum seekers, uprooted from their homes, may find it difficult to bolster
their claims. See Cianciarulo, supra note 13, at 122 ("Corroborating asylum claims
presents significant challenges especially in terms of logistics and authentication.");
see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000). Compara-
tively, depending on the relief sought, other non-citizens seeking relief from re-
moval will find it less difficult to corroborate their claims. For example, a non-
citizen trying to prove hardship to a loved one who is a legal resident of the United
States will be able to corroborate this claim through documentation easily available
in the United States like medical bills or live testimony from social workers. See
generally 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(l)(B) (2000) (waiving inadmissibility to the United
States if denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to certain relatives
who are United States citizens or legal permanent residents).
10
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non-citizens who have lived in the United States for ten years are
more likely to easily obtain witnesses to testify on their behalf.82 In
contrast, it may be that the more legitimate an asylum claim, the less
likely it is that the claimant will be able to corroborate that claim.83 A
legitimate claim, for example, might include a high degree of past per-
secution, and the fear associated with this would make it more diffi-
cult to document or corroborate the persecution as it occurs. Further-
more, asylum seekers often originate "from countries that lack
infrastructure, adequate communication systems, and sometimes even
a functioning government." 84 Corroboration of an asylum claim is thus
quite a difficult task.85 Inversely, and even more unfortunately, a
fraudulent claimant would be likely to have more documentation and
more witnesses than would a valid refugee. 86 Through an asylum
fraud scheme, a claimant could pay witnesses to sign affidavits or tes-
tify on behalf of the claimant. 87
An article by Agata Szypszak vividly illustrates the grueling task
of corroborating a claim and finding witnesses in the asylum con-
text.88 In the article, Szypszak, then a law student, describes how she
and another student in an asylum law clinic helped Dolores Wilson
82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000) (requiring at least ten years of continuous
physical presence in the United States before a non-permanent resident may file an
application for cancellation of removal).
83. Cianciarulo, supra note 13, at 123.
84. Id. at 122.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., John R. B. Palmer, The Second Circuit's "New Asylum Seekers":
Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 965, 992
(2006) (describing instances where asylum claims were proven to be based on false
documentation); David A. Martin, Adelaide Abankwah, Fauziya Kasinga, and the
Dilemmas of Political Asylum, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 243, 243-70 (David A.
Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (telling the story of Adelaide Abankwah who
was granted asylum in the United States through forged documents and fraudulent
testimony).
87. This paradox presupposes that asylum fraud is more than just a product of
society's fear and cynicism. In response to claims that asylum fraud is "rampant," a
Georgetown asylum law expert has stated that the asylum system is "under control."
Fox News (Fox News television broadcast June 25,,2006).
88. See generally Agata Szypszak, Where in the World is Dr. Detchakandi? A
Story of Fact Investigation, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 517 (2000) (describing how difficult
it was for two students at an asylum law clinic to corroborate a claim).
2007] 309
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request asylum before an immigration judge. 89 Wilson was fleeing the
persecution she suffered at the hands of forces loyal to the then presi-
dent of Liberia on account of her service to the prior Liberian presi-
dent.90 The students' primary task was to corroborate the claim with
documentary and testimonial evidence.91 The difficulties the two en-
countered powerfully demonstrate how the refugee's situation makes
it unlikely that the claimant will secure non-hearsay testimony.
Because of the war, Ms. Wilson had not been able to seek medical
attention after being raped. Most of her documents had been de-
stroyed. Nearly all of the people who had known about Ms. Wil-
son's political activities in Liberia and her treatment at the hands of
the rebels had been scattered throughout Liberia and other parts of
Africa. Furthermore, Ms. Wilson asked us not to contact anyone in
Liberia because communications were not secure and she did not
want to put her friends and family in any more danger. 92
In Wilson's case, people who would be able to testify to a "first
hand" account, the type of account that would receive full weight ac-
cording to Gu's holding, had dispersed across the African continent. 93
Even if these people had the resources and the ability to come to the
United States to give a first-hand account of Wilson's treatment at the
hands of the rebels, Wilson feared that if the students contacted these
individuals, it would expose her loved ones to even more danger. 94
The peril associated with contacting people in the persecuting home
country may be so great that a recent argument demands that the regu-
lations explicitly require asylum adjudicators to recognize this dan-
ger.95
89. See id. at 517.
90. See id. at 518-20.
91. Id. at 521.
92. Id. at 520-21.
93. See id. at 522.
94. Id. at 521.
95. Virgil Wiebe, Maybe You Should, Yes You Must, No You Can't: Shifting
Standards and Practices for Assuring Document Reliability in Asylum and With-
holding of Removal Cases (Univ. of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No.
06-18, 2006-2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=899213 [hereinafter Wiebe
I].
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Within the general classification of those covered by the refugee
definition, disparity exists in the ability of particular groups to provide
first-hand evidence to support their claims. Feminist scholars suggest
that female refugees, as compared with male refugees, suffer a perse-
cution unique to their gender.96 Claims made by women may be more
difficult to prove.97 For example, women may not be able to organize
by virtue of their position in society.98 This inability to assemble in the
public sphere renders a female refugee's resistance to her government
unrecognizable in a system where "phallocentricism [masquerades] as
universalism." 99 Similarly cloaked in a "social invisibility,"' 00 lesbi-
ans, gays, bisexual and transgender claimants also encounter a particu-
larly difficult task in obtaining direct or first-hand evidence.' This
invisibility occurs especially in situations where openly expressing
sexual identity implicates danger or where the government censors
sexual discourse.' 0 2
The United Nations anticipated this inverse relationship between
the refugee's plight and the refugee's ability to prove his or her
claim. 10 3 In "most cases" a refugee will arrive with only the "barest
necessities," lacking even personal documents.' 0 4 Judge Pregerson in
Gu's dissenting opinion recognized that the requirement that a refugee
prove refugee status creates a paradox. 0 5 He pointed out that in Ladha
96. See Jacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques on
Refugee Discourse, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 518, 519 (1989).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 520; Marika Meijer, Oppression of Women and Refugee Status, dis-
cussion papers presented at a seminar on refugee women in Soesterberg, Neth., May
22-24, 1985.
99. See Greatbatch, supra note 96, at 519.
100. Deborah A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and
Sexual Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation Asylum Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135,
141 (2006).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See U.N. High Comm'n. on Refugees [UNHCR], Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, IN 195-202,
HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev. 1 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter Handbook].
104. Id. 196.
105. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1025 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (citing Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2000)).
2007]
13
Thomas: "They Told Me He Said He Would Kill Me." Why Hearsay Should Get F
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
312 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
v. INS the Ninth Circuit purported to recognize "the serious difficulty
with which asylum applicants are faced in their attempts to prove per-
secution." 10 6 The majority in Gu ignores that court's own admission
that it is "difficult to imagine" any available testimony other than the
petitioner's own statements.1
0 7
The BIA has also acknowledged that a refugee will not easily be
able to prove his or her claim.' 08 In accordance with the UNHCR, the
BIA recognized that refugees do not "stop to gather affidavits and
other supporting evidence when fleeing persecution."' 0 9 Because of
the refugee's "special situation," the committee recommends a lenient
application of the evidence requirement.1 10 Evidentiary standards must
not be too strict so they may stay aligned with the "humanitarian na-
ture of international refugee law." 1
When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that hearsay evi-
dence may be given less weight than non-hearsay evidence in an asy-
lum proceeding, it flouted the well-established rule regarding the
treatment of hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings. 112 The
majority in Gu v. Gonzales disregards the "well-recognized" difficulty
that asylum applicants face when attempting to prove their claims. 
11 3
The court's holding is illogical because refugees, by their very nature,
often do not have documentary evidence. 114 In doing so, the majority
ignores the inverse relationship between the plight of an uprooted mi-
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981)).
108. In re S-M-J-, 211. & N. Dec. 722, 723 (B.I.A. 1997) cited in Regina Ger-
main, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA Patriot Act
for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 526 (2002).
109. In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445-46 (B.I.A. 1987) (interim or-
der granting asylum) cited in Ilene Durst, Lost in Translation: Why Due Process
Demands Deference to the Refugee's Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L. REv. 127, 131
(2000).
110. Handbook, supra note 103, 1 197.
111. Brian Gorlick, Common Burdens and Standards: Legal Elements in As-
sessing Claims to Refugee Status, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 357, 359-60 (2003).
112. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1026 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Tina Bay, Ninth Circuit Rejects Asylum Claim of Chinese Man, Divided
Panel Rules Credible Hearsay Testimony Not Weighty Enough to Establish Threat
of Future Persecution, METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE (Los Angeles), July 24,
2006, available at http://www.metnews.com/articles/2006/guxx072406.htm.
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grant fleeing persecution, and the ability of that refugee to provide
non-hearsay, in-court testimony regarding his or her persecution.
III. AN IMPOSSIBLE QUEST FOR ACCURACY
Because hearsay evidence will comprise much of the claimant's
testimony, the issue of the weight to be given that evidence is crucial
to the outcome of the case. It is generally agreed that hearsay evidence
is admissible, 115 but courts differ on the issue of its weight. " 6 For in-
stance, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although hearsay
is admissible, the fact that the evidence is hearsay "certainly affects
the weight it is accorded."' 17 The Ninth Circuit in Gu quotes the Third
Circuit when stating that "while hearsay evidence may be given less
weight in immigration proceedings, 'seemingly reliable hearsay evi-
dence should not be rejected.""' 8 The Third Circuit reasoned that al-
though the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigration
proceedings, reliance on hearsay evidence "raises the precise concerns
that are fundamental to its general inadmissibility in civil proceed-
ings." 119
According to the Third Circuit's reasoning, which the Ninth Cir-
cuit follows in Gu, admitted hearsay should be given less weight in
immigration proceedings. 120 The Third Circuit argues for this de-
creased evidentiary weight for the same reasons the Federal Rules of
Evidence actually bars hearsay evidence altogether.1 2' Following this
115. See supranote 11.
116. Schopler, supra note 73, §12[a].
117. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Hand-
book, supra note 103, 197.
118. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021 (citing Dia v. Ahscroft, 353 F.3d 228, 254 (3d Cir.
2003)).
119. Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2002).
120. See Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 549; Gu, 454 F. 3d at 1021.
121. See Ezeagwuna, 325 F.3d at 406 ("Although the Federal Rules do not ap-
ply in this case, exceptions set forth in the Rules focus on trustworthiness, further
indicating why we regard hearsay with a level of suspicion."). The Third Circuit ap-
plied the residual exception to the hearsay bar in this case. Id. The residual exception
accounts for statements that have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,"
which are equivalent to the guarantees found in the other exceptions. See FED. R.
EVID. 807. As Smith and Hake point out, however, the overarching reason for the
Federal Rules is to account for the risks associated with a jury of laypersons and
20071 313
15
Thomas: "They Told Me He Said He Would Kill Me." Why Hearsay Should Get F
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
314 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
logic, it is necessary to first identify the foundation upon which the
federal hearsay exclusion rule stands in order to understand why the
immigration judge as the fact finder should accord less weight to hear-
say evidence.
The "largely accepted" modern account purports that "hearsay is
generally excluded because it is less reliable than live testimony." 122
Hearsay evidence's "fundamental evidentiary flaw" lies in its inability
to be tested through cross-examination of the declarant. 123 The oppor-
tunity to observe the declarant's demeanor "confers depth and mean-
ing upon oath and cross-examination." 124 The "calibration issue" re-
fers to this evidentiary flaw as the "fidelity issue": whether the witness
can accurately report the hearsay evidence that has been told to them
by a child. 125 While hearsay's fundamental flaw relates to the inability
to determine the accuracy of the declarant, another reason the federal
courts generally distrust hearsay lies in their inability to gauge the
level of accuracy with which the in-court witness will reproduce the
statement. 126 These two unknowns create the ultimate danger of hear-
say evidence: the possibility that the tribunal will present unreliable
evidence to the trier of fact.1 27 Inasmuch as the absence of a jury justi-
fies the admission of hearsay evidence in immigration proceedings,
the Ninth and Third Circuits' reasoning is flawed because there is no
fundamental difference between trusting a trained adjudicator to be
exposed to the evidence and trusting the same adjudicator to weigh the
evidence. 128 The federal rule barring hearsay evidence stems from the
thus do not apply in administrative proceedings held before experienced, trained ad-
judicators. See Smith & Hake, supra note 13, at 24.
122. Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modem Hearsay Reform: The Importance
of Conplexity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 367, 370 (1992).
123. Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 51, 55-56 (1988).
124. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
125. Dunning, supra note 78, at 474.
126. Park, supra note 123, at 56.
127. Id. at 58.
128. One of the reasons hearsay is admitted into evidence in immigration pro-
ceedings is that experienced adjudicators, as opposed to juries, can generally be
trusted with less reliable evidence like hearsay testimony. Smith & Hake, supra note
13, at 24. This Note argues that the same justification should support a rule where
the adjudicator is trusted in weighing the evidence, especially after performing a
credibility determination.
16
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intention to "protect a defendant from the power of the state" by main-
taining strict standards of evidence inclusion.'2 9 In asylum proceed-
ings, ironically, this same aim of upholding strict standards actually
hinders the protection of individuals from the persecution of their
home states.
One of the psychological reasons that hearsay is devalued is be-
cause of the many variables in the hearsay chain that might create er-
ror.130 As with the theory behind the Federal Rules, the question of
hearsay weight from a psychological standpoint revolves around a
quest for accuracy. The declarant must perceive, remember, and report
accurately. 13' The witness must do exactly the same.132 Oral transmis-
sion, however, can distort information.' 33 William C. Thompson and
Maithilee K. Pathak argue that the role of a psychologist, when testing
the presumptions about hearsay, is to test variables affecting accuracy
during this transmission chain.' 34 The fear that the jury will give the
evidence too much weight comes from the "well-established" fact that
the information will likely be distorted or changed. 135
Truth can only be discerned if evidence is accurate. Rules for de-
termining what evidence contributes to this determination and what
weight that evidence carries developed in a litigation system where
primary concerns did not yet include refugees.1 36 Richard Friedman
surveyed current hearsay doctrine and questioned to what extent that
doctrine achieves the goal of truth in litigation. 137 Friedman argued
129. See William C. Thompson & Maithilee K. Pathak, Empirical Study of
Hearsay Rules: Bridging the Gap Between Psychology and Law, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 456, 456 (1999).
130. See id. at 464 (listing bias, prejudice, or inadvertent error as possible
variations from an accurate account).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 465.
135. Id.
136. Although refugees have existed throughout most of history, refugee law
did not emerge until 1921 when the League of Nations appointed a High Commis-
sioner for Russian Refugees. LEGOMSKY, supra note 47, at 920. In contrast, the An-
glo-American legal system has grappled with hearsay's admissibility due to the
"sensational trials of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and Sir Walter Raleigh, starting in
the 16th century." Dunning, supra note 78, at 473.
137. See generally Richard D. Friedman, Truth and its Rivals in the Law of
2007] 315
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that the goal of "truth determination" in litigation should be central to
the reform of the hearsay doctrine. 138 But the ultimate goal of asylum
proceedings cannot be to find the same truth, or the same level of ac-
curacy, sought in criminal proceedings or even litigation. The truth of
a litigated event is "what in fact happened."' 139 By definition, a refugee
will not have the same tools, like documentary or first-hand testimo-
nial evidence, to tell the adjudicator what happened. 14 The ultimate
goal of an asylum hearing should be to assess refugee claims, and
grant refuge to genuine refugees. 141 The process is humanitarian in na-
ture. 142 As truth determination "should be the pre-eminent considera-
tion governing evidentiary law" in litigation,143 so the goal of provid-
ing refuge to genuine refugees, through inherent recognition of their
plight, should form the evidentiary law of asylum proceedings. The
question of how much weight to accord hearsay in asylum proceed-
ings should be molded in a way so as to conform to the humanitarian
goal of refuge. Asylum procedure should not be distorted so as to
comport with litigation's rigid system of truth determination.
Keeping in mind that the ultimate goal of the proceeding is to de-
termine genuine refugee status, a strict, truth-seeking evidentiary sys-
tem still has a place within that hearing. That place is at the table
where the attorney for DHS sits. Because due process governs the
proceeding at all times, using hearsay against the non-citizen is fun-
damentally unfair. 144 Therefore government's use of highly unreliable
hearsay violates the non-citizen's due process rights. 145 For example,
in one case, a letter from a declarant three steps away in a hearsay
chain from the actual person who made the original statement claimed
Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1998).
138. Id. at 564.
139. Id. at 546.
140. See Handbook, supra note 103, 196.
141. The ultimate result is protection for genuine refugees. The international
community, "for humanitarian reasons, began to assume responsibility for protecting
and assisting refugees." Id. 1 1.
142. Gorlick, supra note 111, at 359-60; see also Handbook, supra note 103,
[1.
143. Friedman, supra note 137, at 564.
144. See Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 404-05 (6th Cir. 2006).
145. See id. at 405 (citing Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004)).
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that an investigation revealed the claimant's fraud. 14 6 The immigration
judge's admission of this hearsay evidence violated the asylum claim-
ant's due process rights. 147 The fear of unreliability logically carries
over from criminal and civil proceedings when the entity under the re-
sultant structure has the means to meet that structure's stringent stan-
dards. DHS does not find itself in the same situation as a refugee.
IV. IF CREDIBLE, THEN CREDITED
Materials regarding hearsay evidence suggest that the underlying
problem of hearsay involves the inability to determine both the decla-
rant's and the witness's accuracy. 148 Of these risks, only one may in-
variably be assessed during an asylum proceeding while still heeding
the refugee's plight: the claimant's or witness's accuracy. 49 Because
of the refugee's situation, an immigration judge's finding that the
refugee is credible may be the best possible indicator that he or she
speaks truthfully. As far as the ability to test the accuracy of the out-
of-court statement, the refugee's plight will often make this impossi-
ble.' 50 Because of these limitations stenming from the refugee's sce-
nario, the trier of fact should give full weight to the hearsay evidence
within a credible claimant's testimony. To couch it in terms of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the truth of the matter asserted in the out-
of-court statement would be made more probable by the full weight of
the statement. 151 All other hearsay risks that might affect the evi-
dence's weight, risks associated with possible errors in the search for
accuracy and incompatible with the recognition of the refugee's situa-
tion, would no longer apply. This Note argues that the fact finder,
considering the statement as made and true, should then give the hear-
146. See generally Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 406-07 (3d Cir.
2003).
147. Id. at 405-06.
148. See Park, supra note 123, at 55-58.
149. See id. at 55-56.
150. See, e.g., Szypszak, supra note 88, at 521 (explaining that Ms. Wilson did
not want to contact people who could provide first-hand testimony or documentary
evidence supporting her claim for fear that contacting them would place them in fur-
ther danger).
151. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2007] 317
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say statement full weight regardless of whether the statement is hear-
say.
A. The Credibility Determination
In determining whether an asylum applicant has met his or her
burden of proving refugee status, the trier of fact may weigh credible
testimony and evidence of record. 5 2 When neither the immigration
judge nor the BIA has made an adverse credibility finding, the appli-
cant's testimony must be taken as true.153 An adjudicator assesses
credibility by examining many factors: reasonableness of alleged
facts, "consistency and coherence," "corroborative evidence,". "consis-
tency with common knowledge," "and the known situation in the
country of origin."154 Adjudicators must take into account the totality
of the circumstances, considering "demeanor, plausibility, and factual
inconsistencies and omissions."'' 55
In the past, immigration judges based incredibility decisions on
inconsistencies only if the inconsistencies were "major" and went to
"the heart of the claim."' 15 6 The "heart" of an asylum claim includes
the persecutor's identity, the claimant's identity, and the claimant's
fear. 157 With the recent REAL ID Act,' 58 however, refugees may re-
ceive an adverse credibility determination even if the inconsistencies
in their testimony do "not go 'to the heart of the applicant's claim." " 59
The REAL ID Act states that one of the relevant considerations in a
credibility determination is the presence of "any inaccuracies or false-
hoods . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
152. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000).
153. See id.; Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d at 1021 (citing Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d
1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)); id. at 1025 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Smolni-
akova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)); Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d
646, 657 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Gaya Prasad v. INS, 101 F.3d 614, 616 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
154. Gorlick,supra note 111, at371.
155. Cianciarulo, supra note 13, at 129.
156. Elaine C. Schneider, Challenging an Incredibility Finding on Appeal: An
Incredibility Paradigm, 27 WM. MrTCHELL L. REv. 2375, 2398 (2001).
157. Id.
158. REAL ID Act, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
159. Eleanor Acer, Refuge in an Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-
9/11 United States, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1361, 1393 (2005).
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falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim."' 60 With this
change in law, even innocent discrepancies between the claimant's
application and the claimant's testimony may result in an adverse
credibility determination. Often enlisting a third party to file the initial
asylum application, the claimant may not know what facts are essen-
tial to the application or lack the ability to explain the persecution
adequately in writing. 161 Asylum claimants regularly try to add these
facts later, thinking them unimportant at the outset of the application
process. 162 Because legislation like the REAL ID Act increases the
difficulty with which a claimant may be found credible, the immigra-
tion adjudication system is less likely to be regarded as too lenient if it
accords hearsay statements found in credible testimony full weight.
Furthermore, because the REAL ID Act may result in the return of
refugees to the countries which persecute them,' 63 the evidentiary bur-
den should be as lenient as possible once the claimant crosses this ar-
guably harsh barrier.
B. What Should Have Happened in Gu's Case:
Why Gu's Claim Still Fails
After the immigration judge admits hearsay testimony in an asy-
lum proceeding, the finder of fact may consider it and rely on it, even
if the evidence is contradicted by direct evidence. 164 The majority in
160. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000).
161. Durst, supra note 109, at 139, 143-44 (giving examples of when an asy-
lum application conflicted with testimony due to the applicant's ignorance at the
time the application was filed). "Many negative determinations of credibility can be
explained by the inability of the asylum applicant, or his attorney, to translate the
persecution suffered into a narrative graspable by the adjudicator." Id. at 128. See
also, e.g., Susan Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjec-
tivity in Competing Accounts of Political Violence, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 63, 87
n.26 (2001) (noting that asylum was denied when the claimant filed through a notary
who failed to include all the material facts of the claimant's case in the application).
162. See Coutin, supra note 161, at 87 n.26; Durst, supra note 109, at 143-44.
163. See generally Acer, supra note 159, at 1391-94. "[T]his new law consti-
tutes a significant blow to U.S. asylum law and to the rights of refugees." Id. at
1394. "With the REAL ID Act in place, the United States may very well find itself
returning refugees to their countries of persecution, despite its obligations to the
contrary under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol." Id.
164. Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pregerson, J., dis-
senting) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971)). In Richardson v.
2007]
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Gu v. Gonzales made a mistake when it considered the hearsay state-
ment of Gu's friend as "less 'persuasive' or 'specific' than a first-hand
account of the incident would have been."' 165 The majority stated that
because Gu's testimony must be taken as true, the court does not ques-
tion Gu's understanding that the statement was made.' 66 The majority,
however, made a devastating distinction between believing the peti-
tioner, and believing the out-of-court statement.1 67 According to the
majority's rationale, the statement to be regarded as true is "I heard
statement X," and not statement X itself. 168 Thus, the majority's ra-
tionale indicates that the last chronological link in the hearsay trans-
mission chain is to be trusted, 169 but the inability to test the accuracy
of the first link allows for the hearsay evidence to receive less weight
than non-hearsay evidence. 170 The majority goes on to argue that even
if it "were to give full weight to the evidence that the authorities
looked for Gu at his former home in China," the outcome would have
Perales, however, the Supreme Court held that a licensed physician's written report
was admissible even though it was hearsay; despite the presence of opposing direct
medical testimony, the report could constitute substantial evidence to support a find-
ing. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 402. The Court considered the fact that the reports were
"routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists." Id. at
404. The oral recitation of a threat that occurred some time ago and in another coun-
try does not justify the same conclusion of standardized reliability. This Note ac-
counts for that discrepancy. Because the rationale behind the unreliability of hearsay
should not come into play at all in asylum proceedings if the claimant is found
credible, there is no need to search for factors that make the testimony more reliable
than other hearsay.
165. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021 (citing Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448,
1453 (9th Cir. 1985)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. The basic definition of hearsay differentiates between out-of-court state-
ments and statements made while testifying in court. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
Hearsay encompasses the out-of-court statement that is being offered for its truth,
not the in-court statement relating that the testifying witness heard that out-of-court
statement. See id.
169. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021.
170. See id. at 1025 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) ("The majority faults Gu for
failing to provide a 'first hand account' of the incident. But direct evidence that the
security officials had been looking for Gu would not be 'easily available' to Gu."
(citations omitted)).
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been the same because the evidence lacked detail. 171 Here, the major-
ity admits that it did not give the out-of-court statement full weight,
and at the same time, undermines its holding.' 7 2 Even if the majority
had considered the full evidentiary force of the statement, Gu's asy-
lum claim would still have been denied. 173 It is thus possible that a
trained adjudicator could consider the full weight of an out-of-court
statement and find that, even so weighted, the statement is not out-
come determinative. Because the immigration judge and the BIA did
not base their decisions on the hearsay statements in Gu's testi-
mony, 174 it might be assumed that the administrative adjudicators in
Gu's case did just that.
The out-of-court statement should be deemed true if the petitioner
is found credible, and the fact finder must give this evidence, consid-
ered true, the most weight possible. It should be given full weight be-
cause the testimony of the claimant is likely the most probative evi-
dence available. 175 The inquiry in Gu should have been this: if,
because Gu is credible, the trier of fact assumes the friend's out-of-
court statement is true, does that statement make it more likely that
Gu's fear of persecution in China is well-founded? Or, the question
can be stated as it was in Ladha v. INS: "[W]hen an alien credibly tes-
tifies to certain facts, those facts are deemed true, and the question
remaining to be answered becomes whether these facts, and their rea-
sonable inferences, satisfy the elements of the claim for relief." 176 As
suggested above, this inquiry would not invariably result in a success-
ful claim. In Gu, the Ninth Circuit implied that the only true fact was
simply that Gu understood his friend to utter the out-of-court state-
ment. 177 Because most testimony in an asylum proceeding will be that
of the claimant, and not the testimony of first-hand witnesses from the
171. Id. at 1022.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Cianciarulo, supra note 13, at 129.
176. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2000).
177. See Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021.
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claimant's home country,178 this cannot be the interpretation that the
Ladha court intended.
179
Because the immigration judge may consider corroboration of the
claim as a factor in a credibility determination, the requirement of cor-
roboration should be lessened once the claimant has been found credi-
ble. But, because at times the claimant may have nothing but his or
her own testimony to corroborate the claim,' 80 it is inherent that, al-
though corroboration may contribute to a credibility finding, lack of
corroboration should not result in an adverse finding. Accordingly, the
applicant only has the responsibility to support statements with evi-
dence that is "reasonably available."'1 81 Case law suggests that cor-
roborating evidence is necessary when the facts can be easily veri-
fied.182 This standard is a good, moderate hurdle for the credibility
determination as it recognizes the refugee's plight; if the facts cannot
be easily verified, like those surrounding Dolores Wilson's rape,
1 83
only detail, and not corroboration, should be necessary.
Admittedly, this Note's thesis places much in the hands of the
credibility determination. Credibility may already be the "single most
important step" in determining refugee status.1 84 One author argues
that credibility is "the most crucial aspect of any asylum case.'" 185 If a
claimant is not perceived credible, it is unlikely that he or she will be
granted asylum. ' 86 In fact, a positive credibility determination is so es-
sential that scholars have argued the process should begin with a re-
178. Cianciarulo, supra note 13, at 122-23.
179. See Ladha, 215 F.3d at 899 (citing Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985,
992 (9th Cir. 2000)).
180. The Code of Federal Regulation states that testimony alone may be
enough to corroborate a claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a).
181. David K. Reinert, Rape Shield: Immigrants Deserve the Same Protection
We Give Our Citizens, 13 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 355, 369 (2004).
182. Virgil Wiebe, et. al., Asking for a Note from Your Torturer: Corrobora-
tion and Authentication Requirements in Asylum, Withholding and Torture Conven-
tion Claims, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 4-6 (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Wiebe II].
183. See generally Szypszak, supra note 88, at 522-29.
184. Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 367 (2003).
185. Cianciarulo, supra note 13, at 129.
186. Reinert, supra note 181, at 368.
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buttable presumption that the claimant speaks the truth. 87 During the
credibility assessment, however, current law may operate in discord
with the refugee's situation.' 88 A refugee is, by definition, from an-
other country. 189 Cultural and linguistic differences separate the appli-
cant, fleeing a persecuting country, from the adjudicator, accustomed
to the "patriarchal government, [or] the 'good' parent .... 190 Con-
cepts of race might also influence a credibility determination when ad-
judicators' "perceptions of intelligence and of honesty are tainted by
subconscious stereotypes."' 9 1 This Note is predicated on the hope that,
with more scholarship and jurisprudence, the credibility determination
might better acknowledge the refugee's situation.
A comparison of the refugee's plight to the rules regarding hear-
say in other administrative proceedings will demonstrate why it is
necessary to give hearsay testimony full weight when the asylum
claimant is deemed credible. In Calhoun v. Bailar, a former postal
employee challenged hearsay affidavits admitted in an administrative
proceeding which led to his discharge.' 92 There, the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to accept a per se rule that hearsay evidence can never be sub-
stantial evidence.' 93 The court instead returned to the rule that the evi-
dence need only "have probative value and bear indicia of
reliability."' 194 If the evidence is reliable and credible, it may constitute
substantial evidence in administrative settings.' 95
187. Kagan, supra note 184, at 373-74.
188. The REAL ID Act now allows minor discrepancies to affect a credibility
determination. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(2000); see Cianciarulo, supra note 13, at 135 (proposing that legislators should
consider repealing the portion of the REAL ID Act that allows minor discrepancies
to be factored into the credibility determination). This law ignores aspects of the
refugee's plight. See, e.g., id. at 130 (stating that the trauma associated with persecu-
tion an asylum seeker might have endured can actually result in the inability to recall
details).
189. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15) (2000).
190. Durst, supra note 109, at 161.
191. Id. at 165.
192. Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 147 (9th Cir. 1980).
193. Id. at 149.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407-408 (1971); McKee
v. United States, 500 F.2d 525, 528 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Reil v. United States, 456 F.2d
777, 780 (Ct. Cl. 1972); School Bd. of Broward City v. Dep't of Health, Educ. &
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In Calhoun, the court emphasized the reliability and credibility of
hearsay evidence. 196 What makes hearsay evidence reliable and credi-
ble? Although there is no "bright line test," the court lists factors that
could help determine whether the hearsay testimony could constitute
substantial evidence. 197 The application of the Calhoun factors to the
refugee's situation yields absurd results. The final product reveals why
the hearsay testimony presented by a credible claimant should be
given full weight. The first of the Calhoun factors are the bias and in-
dependence of the declarant. 198 In an asylum proceeding, an unbiased
and objective declarant is not likely to appear.' 99 Many declarants will
be subject to the same persecution as the claimant or be the persecu-
tors themselves.2 °° Other Calhoun factors in determining reliable
hearsay are also unlikely to be applicable in an asylum context, simply
because of the refugee's plight: the court in Calhoun considers
whether the statements are contradicted, corroborated, sworn, or
signed.2 °1 With Wilson's situation as representative of a refugee's
plight, 202 the declarants may also fear their own life, and persecutors
are unlikely to give a signed account of their persecution. The title of
Virgil Wiebe's essay, Asking for a Note from Your Torturer, says it
all.203
Welfare, U.S. Office of Educ., 525 F.2d 900, 905-907 (5th Cir. 1976); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Clayton, 578 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1978)).
196. See generally Calhoun, 626 F.2d 145.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating
that the out-of-court declarant was Gu's friend). But cf Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 149
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402-08) (noting that the medical profes-
sionals who routinely prepared the hearsay were unbiased out-of-court declarants).
200. See Szypszak, supra note 88, at 521 (stating that out-of-court declarants
may also be victims of similar persecution); Respondent's Answering Brief at 6,
Perdomo-Duarte v. Gonzales, No. 05-76613 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2006) (finding the
out-of-court declarant, the union, a victim of government persecution).
201. See Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 149.
202. See Szypszak, supra note 88, at 518-19 (describing Dolores Wilson's per-
secution and flight).
203. See Wiebe II, supra note 182.
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There are only two Calhoun factors pertinent to the reliability and
credibility of hearsay evidence in the asylum context, or, rather, there
are only two that are not in discord with the definition of a refugee.
These applicable Calhoun factors are, first, whether or not the decla-
rant is unavailable to testify and no other evidence is available; and
second, the credibility of the witness testifying to the hearsay.2 °4
Within the facts of many asylum claims, the declarant will not be
available to testify.20 5 And, as previously stated, hearsay evidence may
be the only evidence available. 0 6 As to the concern that hearsay evi-
dence lacks reliability, an examination of the credibility of the witness
testifying is required for a successful asylum claim. 207 Applying the
Calhoun factors in the asylum context, the hearsay testimony has met
the minimum threshold of reliability. After considering Calhoun fac-
tors such as the declarant's unavailability and the witness's credibility,
the result is usually this: a credible claimant's hearsay evidence should
constitute "substantial" evidence in the words of the court in Cal-
houn,208 or receive "full weight," in the words of Gu v. Gonzales.
20 9
V. CONCLUSION
In August 2006, Wilfredo Perdomo-Duarte appealed to the Ninth
Circuit from the BIA's decision affirming the immigration judge's de-
nial of his asylum claim. 210 He had claimed he would suffer persecu-
tion upon return to Guatemala because leaders of the Sindicato do
204. See Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 149.
205. See Smith & Hake, supra note 13, at 27 ("The most important, and some-
times the only, evidence in asylum cases is the applicant's testimony. The BIA has
ruled that when the applicant's testimony is the only evidence available, it can suf-
fice to establish eligibility for asylum if it is believable, consistent and sufficiently
detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis of the applicant's
fear.").
206. Id.
207. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000);
see also Calhoun, 62 F.2d at 149-50.
208. Calhoun, 62 F.2d at 149.
209. Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006).
210. Respondent's Answering Brief at 6, Perdomo-Duarte v. Gonzales, No. 05-
76613 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2006).
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Trabajeros Bananeros De Izabal (Banana Workers Union of Izabal), of
which he was once a member, had received death threats. 211 To sup-
port this claim, he submitted an internet newsletter, published by the
union, describing an eight-hour assault on union officials. 212 Misinter-
preting the Gu v. Gonzales holding and unfortunately adopting the Gu
reasoning, the government in its answering brief cites Gu to assert that
the internet publication, as hearsay, is "not authoritative., 21 3 The gov-
ernment continues to argue that if it is credited, the evidence would
still not aid in establishing Perdomo's case because of the attenuated
connection between Perdomo and the assault documented in the news-
letter.214 For example, when Perdomo lived in Guatemala, he went
unharmed. 2 5 His father held a higher position in the union, still lived
in Guatemala at the time of the asylum hearing, and continued to go
unharmed.216 The government discredited the hearsay evidence of a
claim that was already weak.217 In this argument the government mir-
rored the Ninth Circuit in Gu when it reasoned that even if it were to
give Gu's friend's statement full weight, the fact that the authorities
simply came to look for Gu did not prove a well-founded fear of per-
secution.218 Although almost identical, the two arguments subtly but
crucially diverge. The wording in the government's Perdomo brief
misinterprets Gu's holding, expanding on what already constitutes a
blow to the rights of refugees. 219 The government substitutes language
of "credit ' 220 for the court's language of "weight., 221 With this, the
government incorrectly augments the Gu holding from a rule that ac-
cords hearsay less probative value to a rule that eviscerates the evi-
211. Id.
212. See id. at 16-17.
213. Id. at 17.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 15.
217. See generally id. at 11-18.
218. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006).
219. See generally Respondent's Answering Brief, supra note 210, at 17.
220. Id.
221. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021.
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dence altogether. 222 Although the government's claim that hearsay
evidence in asylum law is not authoritative,223 it represents the manner
in which practitioners and officials at the EOIR and BIA levels inter-
pret, and may continue to interpret, the Gu v. Gonzales holding.
Once an asylum claimant has overcome the credibility hurdle, he
or she should be able to testify to all facts that indicate past persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution. The trier of fact should ac-
cord each of these pieces of evidence full weight, regardless of
whether the testimony is based on hearsay or on first-hand knowledge.
Proper consideration of the refugee's plight emasculates the historical
and psychological reasons for devaluing hearsay. A refugee is some-
one fleeing persecution,224 and by this definition, most refugees will
not be able to gather specific, first-hand testimony regarding past per-
secution or a fear of future persecution. This Note's thesis does not
require gullible fact finders to be mesmerized by the horrific facts of
tall tales; there is already a corroboration element to the credibility de-
termination itself. Furthermore, even when the trier of fact allots hear-
say full probative value, the refugee may still fail to meet his or her
burden of proving just a ten percent chance of future persecution upon
return home. If this article's thesis were implemented by the BIA and
the EOIR, no floodgate would open. Indeed, the proposed scheme
would not even open a narrow door for Xiaoguang Gu.
Currently, through federal circuit case law, the demand for cor-
roboration in asylum cases is rising. 225 Gu v. Gonzales, however, de-
mands even more than corroboration; it favors first-hand, in-court tes-
timony.226 Because corroboration is already considered in the
credibility determination, this holding goes too far. Ignoring the refu-
gee's situation, the Ninth Circuit has created an "insurmountable bur-
den., 227 A credible claimant's testimony must be taken as true; spe-
222. See generally Respondent's Answering Brief, supra note 210, at 17.
223. As of the time of this publication, Perdomo-Duarte's case had not yet
been decided by the Ninth Circuit.
224. See supra note 12.
225. Wiebe I, supra note 95, at 16.
226. See Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021.
227. Bay, supra note 114 (quoting Joseph S. Porta, counsel for Xiaoguang Gu).
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cifically, hearsay statements within that credible testimony should be
given their full weight. Only the declarant's accuracy and credibility
are on the line once the claimant's witness is found credible, and these
traits are likely impossible to ascertain in the asylum context. Was
Gu's friend lying? Who knows? Was Gu lying? No.
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